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The Durability of Prison Populations
John F. Pfaff t
Over the past thirty years the US prison population has
exploded in a way unparalleled in American history or world ex-
perience. Since the mid-1970s it has quintupled in size, from just
over 300 thousand inmates to more than 1.5 million. One out of
every one hundred adults-and nearly one out of every twenty
black males-is behind bars. The United States is home to under
5 percent of the world's population, but it warehouses approxi-
mately one out of every three of its prisoners.1
Such a sprawling penal system is expensive. By 2004, states
were spending a total of nearly $40 billion per year to maintain
their populations. Correctional spending generally makes up on-
ly about 2 percent of overall state budgets, but 10 to 20 percent of
state discretionary spending. Even before the current recession,
state legislators were beginning to look for ways to trim back
prison populations and expenditures. 2 As state budgets have
been eviscerated over the past year and a half, the need for re-
form grows all the stronger.
If policymakers are serious about reining in prison popula-
tions (and thus spending), it is essential that they understand
t Associate Professor, Fordham Law School. Thanks to the participants at the
University of Chicago Legal Forum's conference on Crime, Criminal Law, and the Reces-
sion for very helpful comments. Sean Koehler provided outstanding research assistance.
All errors are my own.
1 See Pew Center on the States, One in 100: Behind Bars in America 2008 5, 35
(2008), online at httpV/www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/8015PCTSPrisonO8
-FINAL_2-1-1_FORWEB.pdf (visited Oct 3, 2010); Roy Walmsley, World Prison Popula-
tion List, 3 (King's College London International Center for Prison Studies 2007), online
at httpi/www.kcl.ac.uk/depstaVlaw/researcb/icps/downloads/world-prison-pop-seventh.pdf
(visited Oct 3, 2010). The one-in-three figure includes both prison and jail populations,
but the United States' share of the world's prison populations (as opposed to its prison
and jail populations) is likely similar.
2 See, for example, Robin Campbell, Dollars and Sentences: Legislators' Views on
Prisons, Punishment, and the Budget Crisis (Vera Institute of Justice 2003), online at
http//www.vera.org/download?file=105/Dollars%2Band%2Bsentences.pdf (visited Oct 3,
2010); Daniel F. Wilhelm and Nicholas R. Turner, Issues in Brief. Is the Budget Crisis
Changing the Way We Look at Sentencing and Incarceration? (Vera Institute of Justice
2002), online at http;//www.vera.org/download?file=269/IIB0/2BBudgetO/2Bcrisis.pdf
(visited Oct 3, 2010).
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what has powered growth over the past three decades. In anoth-
er paper, I develop evidence suggesting that prison growth has
not been driven by longer sentences but rather by increased ad-
missions. 3 Specifically, I demonstrate that the typical prisoner
does not spend much time in prison-the median inmate often
serves under two years (and sometimes as little as six months),
and 75 percent of all inmates are released within two to five
years. A clear policy recommendation seems to flow from these
results: state governments can quickly shrink prison populations
simply by reducing new admissions, thus avoiding maneuvers
with more potential political risk, such as granting early releases
or reducing the official sentences for many crimes.
But the truth is a bit more complicated. Median and 75th
percentile times to release can remain flat-or even fall-during
periods in which prison population growth is being driven almost
exclusively by a small number of inmates receiving increasingly
longer sentences. The larger this cluster of long-serving inmates,
the more slowly changes to admissions alone can shape future
prison populations. This paper seeks to explore more carefully
how important these long-serving inmates are to prison popula-
tions-and thus to provide a better understanding of the options
available to policymakers who wish to meaningfully cut overall
prison populations.
I have two goals here. The first is to assess the short-run
importance of long-serving inmates to prison reform, which I do
by measuring the extent to which these "durable" offenders limit
the efficacy of short-term "admission-side" reforms. 4 To do this, I
develop several counterfactual experiments using detailed in-
mate-level data from eleven states. In particular, I examine how
much smaller prison populations would have been in 2001 had
states enacted one of six reforms: reducing the number of admis-
sions per year by 25 percent or 100 percent (that is, admitting no
one) starting in either 1996 or 1999, or reducing the time served
by all newly admitted prisoners by 25 percent starting in either
1996 or 1999.
My results indicate that such reforms would be relatively
effective despite the presence of some long-serving inmates.
3 John F. Pfaff, The Myths and Realities of Correctional Severity: Evidence from the
National Corrections Reporting Program on Sentencing Practices, Am L & Econ Rev
(forthcoming 2011).
4 I use "admission-side reforms" to refer to changes in either the number of admis-
sions or, less frequently, the time actually served by newly admitted inmates. This ap-
proach contrasts with "release-side reforms" such as early releases or furloughs, which
change the time to be served by those admitted to prison before the reforms are adopted.
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Reducing admissions by 25 percent leads to populations that are
15 to 20 percent smaller than they otherwise would have been
within two years and 19 to 23 percent smaller than otherwise
within five years. The 100 percent cut leads to population be-
tween 53 and 79 percent smaller than otherwise within two
years and between 75 and 93 percent smaller than otherwise
within five years. Reducing time served is also effective, though
less so than admitting fewer inmates: reducing time served by 25
percent results in populations that are 7 to 16 percent smaller
than otherwise within two years and 12 to 21 percent smaller
than otherwise within five years.
The second goal of this paper is to measure the limits to ad-
mission-side reforms that are exposed by these counterfactuals.
Note, for example, that a state can admit no prisoners for five
years yet see its prison population drop to only 25 percent of
what it otherwise would have been. 5 Durable inmates still exist,
and they effectively create a "floor" below which admission-side
reforms cannot push prison populations. To measure this floor, I
extrapolate release trends into the future-always a risky en-
deavor, the results of which should be evaluated with some
caution-to estimate how the floor decays over time. Based on
various assumptions about trends in releases, my results suggest
that admissions in eleven states from the late 1980s through
2002 created a cluster of inmates that will total between 25,500
and 56,000 in 2018-or between 84,000 and 184,000 nationwide,
if my results can be extrapolated to the rest of the country.6 The
upper bound is half the total prison population of the late 1970s,
but the less-extreme estimates imply that these long-serving in-
mates need not exert that much influence down the line.
This paper is organized as follows. Part I provides the moti-
vation for this paper by detailing the current budgetary pres-
sures forcing states to rethink their long reliance on incarcera-
tion. It also summarizes the short-sentence findings of my earlier
work and explains in more detail the long-serving inmate prob-
lem. Part II then develops the models establishing the short-run
responsiveness of state prison populations to changes in the size
of admission cohorts and in the time actually served by those
5 In other words, if a state's actual admission and release policies would have led to
a prison population of 100,000 in 2001, the decision to admit no prisoners between 1996
and 2001 would have resulted in a prison population of 25,000 as of 2001. This is a num-
ber substantially less than 100,000, but also substantially greater than zero.
6 Note that this floor is not the entire prison population, since some of those admit-
ted between 2002 (when my data end) and 2018 will still be in prison in 2018 as well.
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inmates. And Part III measures the floor that long-serving in-
mates admitted during the 1980s and 1990s impose on future
prison populations. It also estimates how much these long-
serving inmates contribute to the overall cost a given entering
cohort imposes on state budgets. Finally, the Appendix provides
a detailed discussion of the data and methods used in this paper.
I. PRISON BUDGETS, THE TYPICAL PRISONER, AND
THE LONG-SERVING INMATE PROBLEM
Figure 1 shows the dramatic and unprecedented growth in
US prison population over the past three decades. For fifty years
the incarceration rate hovered around 100 per 100,000 only to
soar to over 750 per 100,000 today. In this section I touch on
three aspects of this meteoric rise: its cost, the fact that most
prisoners serve relatively short sentences, and the theoretical
implications of this latter fact for state efforts to rein in prison
growth.











Historical prison data - BJS prison data
A. The Strain (of Sorts) of Prison Expenditures
As prison populations have climbed, so have the expendi-
tures on maintaining them. States spent a total of $2.8 billion on
corrections in 1977 and $39.3 billion in 2004; this represents a
thirteen-fold increase in nominal dollars and a four-and-half-fold
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increase in real dollars (although per-prisoner expenditures have
actually declined slightly in real terms).7 The post-Internet-boom
recession of 2000 encouraged state legislators to start thinking
about how to pare back prison expenditures; 8 the financial pres-
sures of the current credit crisis have only strengthened their
desire to effect reform.
Yet the fiscal story is more complex than that suggested by
the total rise in spending, and untangling it may help explain
what is driving political calls for reform. There are two possible
reasons policymakers want to cut back prison spending: as a
short-run response to immediate fiscal pressures, or as part of a
longer-run plan to alter more fundamentally how state resources
are spent. Looking at the shares of state budgets allocated to cor-
rections, plotted in Figure 2, casts some light on these political
motives.
Figure 2 provides two ways of measuring correctional spend-
ing.9 Figure 2A plots corrections' share of the overall budget, and
Figure 2B plots their share of the discretionary budget. The re-
sults are perhaps surprising: despite a 450 percent increase in
total real expenditures on corrections, the share of state budgets
given to prisons has remained relatively low and flat. As a share
of total spending, the median rose slightly, from 1.4 percent in
1977 to 2.6 percent in 2004;10 almost no state ever dedicated
more than 4 percent of its budget to corrections. In other words,
7 Nominal expenditures grew from just under $11,000 per prisoner in 1977 to nearly
$30,000 in 2004; $11,000 in 1977 was worth approximately $33,500 in 2004. All state
budget figures come from the US Department of the Census's Survey of Government
Finances dataset, online at http;//www.census.gov/govgwww/fimancegen.html (visited Oct
3, 2010). Real values are calculated using the Bureau of Labor Statistics CPI deflator,
online at http/www.bls.gov/datafmflation-calculator.htm (visited Oct 3, 2010). I use the
prison population counts released by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, online at http /bjs.
ojp.usdoj.govfmdex.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=1763 (visited Oct 3, 2010).
8 See, for example, Campbell, Dollars and Sentences at 3; Wilhelm and Turner,
Issues in Brief at 2 (cited in note 2).
9 For those unfamiliar with box plots: for each year the horizontal line in the middle
of the box is the percent-of-budget value for the median state, the upper edge of the box is
that for the 75th percentile state, and the lower edge is that for the 25th percentile state.
The whiskers extend to 1.5 times the difference between the 75th and 25th percentile
values (the "interquartile range"), and dots represent outlier values that fall outside the
range of the whiskers. Particularly extreme outliers (such as the value near 10 percent in
Figure 2A) may reflect errors in the data.
10 The detailed state-government data needed to calculate the discretionary part of
the budget are available only through 2004. The Census has released more-aggregated
data through 2008; the median percent of total expenditures spent on corrections re-
mained 2.6 percent that year. Unfortunately, data are not yet available for 2009, when
the current crisis appears to have reached its peak.
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the large spike in correctional expenditures closely tracks a more
general growth in state revenue and expenditures.
Figure 2. Corrections as % of budget
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As William Spelman has pointed out, however, looking at
overall state budgets is somewhat deceptive.1 A significant
share of state spending is on mandated, nondiscretionary ex-
penditures over which state officials have little year-to-year con-
trol, and so it is worth examining the share of the discretionary
budget allotted to corrections. Following Spelman, I define the
discretionary budget as the overall budget minus spending on
public health, primary- and secondary-school education, trans-
portation, debt payments, and certain insurance payouts. Figure
2B plots the results. On the one hand, the results differ from
those in Figure 2A in a few noticeable ways: the share of discre-
tionary spending on corrections by 2004 is substantially higher
(median around 8.5 percent, with highs reaching over 14 per-
cent), and there is a more appreciable jump in the early 1980s
along with steadier upward growth during the early 1990s. 12 On
the other hand, the two plots share at least one important com-
mon feature, namely that both remain relatively flat throughout
much of the 1990s and 2000s.
This latter budgetary stability provides some hints about
legislative desires for reform. The 2000 recession does not appear
to have affected state financial conditions significantly (at least
with respect to corrections), yet it led to calls for reducing correc-
tional expenditures. This suggests that legislators may have
viewed it as providing a convenient justification (or political cov-
er) to enact more substantive reforms in criminal justice policy.
And by the early 2000s, legislators certainly had valid reasons to
shift spending priorities: crime rates had dropped since the early
1990s to the lowest levels in a generation, reducing the political
salience of tough-on-crime stances (or soft-on-crime accusations),
and freeing politicians to focus on other public harms.
Yet despite the calls for reform, the rate of prison population
growth slowed only somewhat, and it certainly did not change
direction. It has taken the financial pummeling of the current
credit crisis, an event far more significant than the deflating of
the Internet bubble, to force states to adopt more drastic
measures to slow down or halt prison growth.1 3 These obser-
11 William Spelman, Crime, Cash, and Limited Options: Explaining the Prison Boom,
8 Criminol & Pub Pol 29, 63 (2009).
12 The flatness of Figure 2A, and even that of Figure 2B (given the scale of increase
in prison population), suggests that slack budgetary constraints may have played an
important role in prison growth: it may not be a coincidence that the longest sustained
growth in prison populations coincided with one of the longest economic expansions in
American history.
13 Jennifer Steinhauer, for example, discusses the extent to which state budgets have
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vations imply that whatever the underlying desire for change, it
takes serious financial strain to produce real reform.
The effect of the current recession on future prison popula-
tions is thus unclear. On the one hand, states may use it as an
opportunity to enact far-reaching reforms that lead to smaller
long-run prison populations. On the other hand, they may simply
focus on short-run cuts that will ultimately allow prison popula-
tions to return to their pre-recession levels. Rather than try to
read legislative minds and tea leaves, I focus on both issues: I
examine how quickly states can cut prison populations in the
short run as well as what kinds of barriers today's prison popula-
tions pose to reducing prison size further in the future.
In particular, I evaluate two options that policymakers have
at their disposal: cutting back on the number of new admissions
or reducing the time served by new admissions. I refer to these
as "admission-side" reforms, as opposed to "release-side" ap-
proaches such as early releases and furloughs, which I do not
consider here.14 The effectiveness of these reforms depends criti-
cally on the durability of the current prison population. If the
current population is highly durable-if next year's prison popu-
lation roughly equals this year's even if no new prisoners are
admitted-then admission-side changes will work very slowly. I
thus measure the durability of prison populations and ask how
quickly these admission-side approaches can reduce prison popu-
lations in both the short run (within two to five years) and the
long run (fifteen to thirty years).
suffered during the credit crisis, and Hal Weitzman examines the recent pressures to
reduce prison population sizes (as opposed, perhaps, to just the rate of growth). See
Jennifer Steinhauer, As the Economy Falters, So Do State Budgets, NY Times 12 (Mar 17,
2008); Hal Weitzman, US Jails Set to Empty as States Reduce Deficits, Financial Times 9
(Nov 14, 2009).
14 1 put release-side options to the side for two reasons. First, their effectiveness is
trivial to examine. If policymakers can release any number of current prisoners then they
can essentially use that tool to set the prison population to any desired level. (A non-
trivial question to ask is what limits exist on the number that can in fact be released
early, but that is one beyond the scope of this paper.) And second, release-side options
may be less politically viable. Early releases, for example, are likely attributable to a
specific official (note that when Maurice Clemmons killed four Lakewood, Washington,
police officers in 2009, journalists immediately seized on Mike Huckabee's 2000 decision
to commute Clemmons's sentence), while the responsibility for failing to incarcerate an
offender, or for doing so for less time, is much more diffuse. Furthermore, if people inter-
pret the sentence imposed as a signal of the severity of the crime, then reducing a sen-
tence can be seen as unjust leniency for an offender already deemed to have merited a
particular sanction. Imposing a shorter or non-incarcerative sentence, however, takes
place before the signal is created and, in fact, produces a lesser signal.
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B. Seemingly Nondurable Prison Populations
At first blush, prison populations do not appear to be partic-
ularly durable. I recently calculated how many days the median,
75th percentile, and 90th percentile prisoner in each entering
cohort 15 actually spend in prison for eleven states, from the late
1980s through the early 2000s. 16 It turns out that the typical
prisoner does not spend that much time in prison. Median times
to release are often under two years, and in big states such as
California and Illinois they are as low as six months. Seventy-
fifth percentile times to release are often under five years, and
in some cases they are as low as one or two years. The results are
perhaps surprising, given the frequent attention-in academic
and media reports alike-to prisoners receiving very long
sentences.
Such low numbers suggest that prison populations should
decay quickly. Consider a state like California, where half of all
admitted prisoners are released within six months and 75 per-
cent within a year. Such rapid rates of release seem to imply that
the prison population in, say, 2011 would be composed almost
entirely of prisoners admitted in 2010 and 2011-and thus that
such prison populations would respond quickly to changes in
admission policies. 17
But this need not be the case: low median and 75th percen-
tile times to release can mask an influential cadre of long-serving
inmates. And these long-serving inmates can restrict a state's
ability to reduce its prison population via admission-side reforms
in both the short and long runs. Understanding their importance
is thus essential for any sort of reform.
Two simple examples illuminate the problem of long-serving
inmates. The first points out a potential pitfall in drawing infer-
ences from low median times served: the median can decline
even when prison growth is driven almost entirely by inmates
serving longer sentences. The second then demonstrates how this
15 In other words, I look at all the prisoners who enter in a particular year and cal-
culate how long it takes the median prisoner to be released. This is in contrast to how the
Bureau of Justice Statistics often derives median times, which it does by computing the
median time served by all prisoners released in a particular year.
16 See Pfaff, Correctional Severity (cited in note 3). The eleven states are those listed
in Table 2 below. These states possess approximately 30 percent of all prisoners in the
United States; while underrepresenting the South, they reflect a rough cross-section of
the US.
17 In other words, if the prison population in 2011 is composed almost entirely of
prisoners admitted since 2010, then reforms enacted at the end of 2009 would seem likely
to have an immediate and almost complete effect on prison populations in 2011.
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small cadre of long-serving inmates (should it exist) can function
as a serious brake on prison reform, even when the median and
75th percentile prisoners leave quickly.
Example 1. Imagine a state that admits one prisoner con-
victed of a serious crime every year to serve a ten-year sentence.
After ten years, the state's prison population reaches its equilib-
rium size of ten.18 In some future year, though, the state decides
to crack down on crime and enacts two reforms. First, it increas-
es the sanction for the serious crime from ten years to twenty.
Second, it starts incarcerating two minor offenders each year for
one-year sentences. The new equilibrium prison population is
now twenty-two. 19 Note that the median time served in each en-
tering cohort drops from ten years to one year,20 despite the fact
that 91 percent (20/22) of the growth is due to longer sentences. 21
Example 2. A state admits one hundred prisoners every
year, of whom fifty serve six months, twenty-five one year, and
twenty-five x years. Thus half of all prisoners are released within
six months and 75 percent within a year, which approximates
the actual release rates in California and Illinois. It is easy to
show that the durability of prison populations, and thus the ef-
fectiveness of admission-side reforms, depends critically on x.
Table 1 reports the effect of three values of x: two years, five
years, and twenty-five years. The first row provides the equilib-
rium population for each x. 22 The second and third rows consider
a hypothetical "shocked population": how big would the prison
population be if, after reaching equilibrium, the state simply
admitted no one to prison for one year? The second row presents
the absolute size of this shocked population, and the third row
("% Change (1)") the percentage change. The fourth row ("%
Change (2)") gives the subsequent percentage change that would
18 For the first ten years, the state admits one prisoner each year and releases zero.
At the beginning of the eleventh year, it admits one prisoner but also releases one (the
prisoner admitted ten years earlier), thus establishing an equilibrium population of ten.
19 In any given year, there are twenty inmates serving twenty-year sentences
(one with twenty years left, one with nineteen left, and so on) and two serving one-year
sentences.
20 The median time to be served of those currently in prison is, of course, twenty
years. But the median times of both those entering and those leaving prison are just one
year.
21 Or perhaps 100 percent, if one considers the decision to admit two minor offenders
for one year as a decision to raise their sentences from zero years to one.
22 For example, if x = 5, then at any given point there are twenty-five inmates serving
six months (since only half of the fifty are in prison on any specific day), twenty-five serv-
ing one year, and 125 serving five years (twenty-five with all five years left, twenty-five
with four years left, and so on down to twenty-five with one year left).
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take place were the state to admit no one to prison for a second
consecutive year.
Table 1. Population durability for various long-serving rates
Value of x
2 5 25
Eq. Population 100 175 550
Shock Pop. 25 100 475
% Change (1) 75% 43% 14%
% Change (2) 100% 25% 5%
As Table 1 makes clear, even in the presence of low median
and 75th percentile times to release, prison populations can be
quite durable. If x equals 5, for example, a one-year freeze results
in a drop of only 43 percent, even though 75 percent of all
those admitted the year before leave prison that year. If x equals
25, the results are even more dramatic, with a drop of only 14
percent.
Note, too, that the long-serving inmates can cause the effect
of a reduction in admissions to decline over time. For an x of 5,
the effect of a second-year freeze is barely half that of the first
year freeze (25 to 43 percent), and it is two-thirds smaller when x
equals 25 (5 to 14 percent).23 The intuition is straightforward.
The reforms quickly remove all the short-serving inmates, leav-
ing behind only the slowly depreciating long-serving inmates. 24
There are a few important points to take away from these
examples. First, despite the presence of low medians and other
quantiles, state prison populations may nonetheless be home to a
durable core of prisoners. Second, these prisoners may make
admission-side reforms almost impossible (as when x equals 25).
And third, when the number of long-serving inmates is suffi-
ciently low, states may be able to accomplish a fair amount in the
short run with admission-side reforms but then face diminishing
returns in the longer runs (such as when x equals 5).
As the next two sections make clear, the third point seems to
best explain what we see in the data. States can reduce their
23 For x = 5, the second year of admissions freeze sees the prison population drop by
only 25, from 100 to 75; for x = 25, also a drop of only 25, but from 475 to 450.
24 As this core depreciates, the percent effect will gradually creep up again, since (by
the design of this example) the number leaving each year is fixed but the number remain-
ing declines. Thus the value of 100 percent for x = 2.
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current populations rather quickly using admission-side reforms,
but the effectiveness of such policies plateaus. In the long run,
then, there is a core of prisoners admitted between the late 1980s
and early 2000s-perhaps on the order of 100,000-that may
remain in prison through 2020 in the absence of release-side re-
forms. Part II turns its attention to the short-run responsiveness
of prison populations, and Part III to the long run.
II. THE SHORT-RUN RESPONSIVENESS OF PRISON POPULATIONS
To examine how quickly state prison populations would re-
spond to admission-side reforms, I use data from the National
Corrections Reporting Program (NCRP) to simulate prison popu-
lation growth under varying assumptions. The NCRP is an
inmate-level dataset that allows me to calculate (to the day) how
long offenders spend in prison; I use it to construct model prison
populations and subject them to various admission-side shocks,
measuring how the populations change in response. My results
suggest that states can realize substantial declines in prison
populations within one or two years solely by adjusting the num-
ber of new inmates admitted or (to a lesser degree) the time
these new entrants serve.
The Bureau of Justice Statistics began the NCPR in 1983,
and while approximately forty states participate in the program
today, I focus here on the eleven states that provide the most
reliable data for sufficiently long periods of time: California, Col-
orado, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New
Jersey, South Dakota, Virginia, and Washington State.25 The
most obvious limitation to this sample is that it underrepresents
the South. Otherwise, these states possess roughly the expected
number of prisoners (22 percent of the states and 31.5 percent of
the nation's prisoners in 2002; 20 percent and 19.5 percent, re-
spectively, without California), and they are relatively repre-
sentative of the country as a whole when it comes to political ide-
ology, demographics, and so on.26 Table 2 lists the first year for
which each state provided complete data and the fraction of the
nation's prison population each state housed in 2002.27
25 As I explain in the Appendix, I consider a state's data sufficiently "reliable" in a
particular year if the number of admissions and releases reported by the NCRP are with-
in 10 percent of those values as given by the Bureau of Justice Statistics' National Prison
Statistics program. A "sufficient" number of years is at least eleven.
26 Pfaff, Correctional Severity (cited in note 3), evaluates the representativeness of
this sample in more detail in its Appendix.
27 For each state the time series runs through 2002, the last year of NCRP data
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Table 2. Included states








New Jersey 1992 2%
South Dakota 1991 0.2%
Virginia 1987 3%
Washington 1987 1%
Note: First year of data refers to the first year of reliable da-
ta, not necessarily the first year the state participated in the
NCRP. The national population percentages are for 2002.
The Appendix discusses the NCRP, and how I address its
limitations, in more detail. For our purposes here, what matters
is that it provides the date of entry and exit for each inmate (or
just the date of entry for those not released by the end of 2002) as
well as the inmate's official sentence (specifically, the total max-
imum sentence imposed) and most serious conviction offense. 28 I
know the exact number of inmates released from each annual
entering cohort, but due to errors in the NCRP, I have only (de-
cent) approximations of the number admitted each year who are
not released by 2002.
I use the NCRP data to create ersatz prison populations that
I can then manipulate. I start by calculating how many prisoners
each entering cohort contributes to each subsequent year's prison
population: of those admitted in, say, 1990, how many are still in
prison at the end of 1990? 1991? 1992? And so on through the
end of 2002. This allows me to build up prison populations that
look nothing like real prison populations in the early years but
closely mimic them by the mid to late 1990s. I then examine how
available when I began this paper. Note that the NCRP provides data only on state pris-
oners, not federal prisoners housed in those states.
28 There are, of course, other relevant sentences, such as the minimum, but the total
maximum is the sentence that is reported most consistently. Shortcomings in the NCRP
also force me to cluster imnates' offenses into fifteen categories and the sentence imposed
into sixteen. The Appendix provides a more in-depth explanation of these issues. Despite
its limitations, the NCRP remains the richest multistate prisoner dataset available.
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these later-year prison populations respond to changes in ad-
mission policies.
A concrete example can clarify. Table 3 provides data from a
hypothetical state whose data start in 1990. In that year, the
state admits 1,000 inmates, 500 of whom are still incarcerated at
the end of 1990, 200 at the end of 1991, 100 at the end of 1992,
and none by the end of 1993. In 1991, the state admits 1,500 in-
mates, 750 of whom are still incarcerated at the end of that year,
300 at the end of 1992, and so on. The value of 1,400 in the
starred cell reflects the fact that by the end of 1992, admissions
since 1990 have contributed a net total of 1,400 inmates to the
state's prison population (the 100 remaining from 1990, the 300
remaining from 1991, and the 1,000 remaining from 1992). This
"Total" row is my ersatz prison population.
Table 3. Simulation example
Year Ad- Prisoners remaining at end of year:
mits 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
1990 1000 500 200 100 0 0
1991 1500 750 300 150 0
1992 2000 1000 400 200
1993 2500 1250 500
1994 3000 1500
Total 500 950 1400 1800 2200
_________ _______ __________(*)______
Note that "Total" does not report the actual prison popula-
tion, nor are changes in the "Total" row equal to changes in the
actual prison population. The real prison population in 1991, for
example, is larger than 950 since that number does not account
for any prisoners admitted prior to 1990 who are still in prison at
the end of 1991. Similarly, the change in "Total" from, say, 1991
to 1992 reflects only the effect of post-1990 changes; some of
those admitted prior to 1990 are released during this time as
well, but their departure is unrecorded. Thus "Total" underesti-
mates the size of the population but overestimates the rate of
growth.
In effect, the "Total" row calculates the state's prison popula-
tion by assuming that it is equal to zero when a state's data
start. This is done solely as a concession to limitations in the
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NCRP data, 29 but it nonetheless yields informative numbers.
Though a highly inaccurate measure of total population at the
start of a state's time series, the "Total" measure closely approx-
imates the true population by the mid to late 1990s (providing
further evidence that most prisoners serve fairly short terms).30
Table 4 compares the values of my ersatz prison populations to
their real counterparts (taken from the Bureau of Justice
Statistics' National Prisoner Survey) in 1996, 1999, and 2001.
Table 4. Comparing ersatz to real prison populations
St 1996 1999 2002
Real Ersatz % Real Ersatz % Real Ersatz %
CA 146049 135248 92 163067 152413 93 159444 143446 90
CO 12438 9819 79 15670 13800 88 17448 15902 91
IL 38852 36416 94 44660 43400 97 44348 43726 99
KY 12910 12257 95 15317 14667 96 15424 15628 101
MI 42349 37701 89 46617 45324 97 48849 47838 98
MN 5158 5968 116 5969 6968 117 6606 7863 119
NE 3287 3670 112 3688 4675 127 3937 4936 125
NJ 27490 23087 84 31493 28080 89 28142 25151 89
SD 2063 1819 88 2506 2368 94 2790 2646 94
VA 27655 27767 100 29789 29881 100 31662 32112 101
WA 12527 11983 96 14590 14152 97 15159 14735 97
Note - Percentages measure how close the ersatz populations come to the real- The
'Real" values are taken from the Bureau of Justice Statistics National Prisoner Survey
(NS).
As is immediately clear, even by 1996 most ersatz prison
populations are quite close to their real levels, and all are within
at least 89 percent of the NPS by 2001. In some cases, my ersatz
prison populations are larger than the NPS estimates, even
though the latter values include prisoners not in the former (that
is, those admitted before the start year given in Table 2 and not
yet released). These overages, however, are always small in abso-
lute value; such discrepancies are to be expected, given the
notorious noisiness of criminal justice statistics.
Though my ersatz populations closely approximate the real
populations, my design does introduce a potentially important
source of selection bias. The prisoners missing from my popula-
tions are, by definition, those serving the longest sentences-the
29 By definition, data before the first available year are unreliable.
30 In other words, my approach assumes that California's prisons are empty at the
start of 1988 (and Colorado's at the start of 1992, Illinois's at the start of 1990, and so on),
and that the ersatz 1988 population is just the number of prisoners admitted in 1988 and
not released by the end of that year. Such a measure clearly underestimates the real
population, since it ignores all those admitted before 1988 who are still in prison at the
end of 1988. The 1995 estimate, however, is closer to the real value since the importance
of the pre-1988 inmates declines every year (as more and more of them are released be-
tween 1988 and 1995), and the 1999 estimate is thus closer still.
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very inmates whose influence I am attempting to measure. 31 I
account for this bias below; it does not appear to exert a sig-
nificant effect.
To explore the durability of prison populations, I use my er-
satz populations to effectively recreate the thought experiment
given in Table 1 above: How quickly would prison populations
decline if states permanently reduced their rates of admissions? I
shock the size of the admission class in some year, say 1999, by
simply dropping some percent of the entering cohort from my
sample and comparing population growth in the shocked and
unshocked scenarios.
A simple example, built on that given in Table 3, illuminates
how this works. Assume I build up the ersatz prison population
until 1992, at which point I shock all future admission cohorts,
randomly reducing their numbers by 10 percent. Thus in the
shocked scenario the state would admit 1,000 prisoners in 1990;
1,500 in 1991; but only 1,800 in 1992; 2,250 in 1993; and 2,700 in
1994. And of the 1,800 admittees from 1992, I would observe 900
of them remaining at the end of 1992, 360 at the end of 1993, and
180 at the end of 1994; the patterns for the 1993 and 1994 enter-
ing cohorts would follow suit.32 My shocked ersatz prison popula-
tion would thus be 500 in 1990 and 950 in 1991 (since no changes
have yet occurred), 1,300 in 1992 (compared to 1,400, a 7.1 per-
cent reduction), 1,635 in 1993 (compared to 1,800, a 9.2 percent
reduction), and 1,980 in 1994 (compared to 2,200, the full 10 per-
cent reduction).33
I consider two types of shocks here: to the number admitted
and to time served. In other words, states could attempt to re-
duce future prison populations either by admitting 10 percent
fewer inmates each year or by keeping the number of admissions
unchanged but requiring inmates to serve sentences that are 10
percent shorter in practice. 34 Both are admission-side reforms,
31 In other words, the only prisoners unaccounted for in California's ersatz prison
population in 2002 are those who were admitted before 1988 and thus have served at
least fourteen years.
32 Approximately. I do not cull observations based on time actually spent in prison,
but a uniformly random 10 percent reduction will, on average, reduce each cluster of time
served by 10 percent.
33 Because my example does not have any long-serving inmates (100 percent are
released within three years), a 10 percent reduction in admissions leads to a prison popu-
lation 10 percent smaller in three years.
31 If earlier releases or fewer admissions increase the crime rate (either through
higher recidivism or first-offense rates) and states respond to the higher crime rates by
increasing their incarceration rates, then my results may overstate the effectiveness of
admission-side reforms. How significant this effect may be, however, is unclear. The
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and both have arguments in their favor. Cutting sentence length,
for example, aligns well with the research showing that the cer-
tainty of punishment is a greater deterrent than its severity; cut-
ting time served may thus not significantly reduce deterrence. 35
And it may be politically more tenable to impose lesser sentences
on many offenders than no prison sentences at all on a smaller
number of criminals. 36 On the other hand, there is evidence that
even short incarcerations can impose important personal and
social costs, so reducing the number of people entering prison in
the first place may yield important dividends. 37 As I show below,
shocks to the number admitted reduce prison populations faster
than comparable reductions in time served.
I start with the number-admitted shocks. I develop four
counterfactuals here: 100 percent reductions (total admissions
freezes) starting in either 1999 or 1996 and continuing through
2001, and 25 percent reductions starting in either 1999 or 1996
and again running through 2001.38 Clearly, no state would ever
completely stop admitting people to prison, but such a scenario
creates a hypothetical comparable to the illustrative example
given in Table 1; it thus provides a clear way to shed light on the
effect of long-serving inmates on short-run reductions. The 25
percent cut reflects a more plausible, if still somewhat extreme,
situation. Starting the cuts in 1996 grants me a longer view, but
starting the cuts in 1999 minimizes the importance of changing
policy over time.39 For reasons I explain in the Appendix, I end
relationship between length of sentence and recidivism appears to be week (see, for ex-
ample, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report, Recidivism of Prisoners Released in
1994 (DOJ 2002), online at http//bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf (visited Oct
3, 2010)), and while the best evidence suggests that decreasing incarceration increases
crime on average (see, for example, Steven Levitt, The Effect of Prison Population Size on
Crime Rates: Evidence from Prison Overcrowding Litigation, 111 Q J Econ 319 (1996)), it
is no longer clear that that is true on the margin, given the size of the US prison popula-
tion.
35 Consider Erling Eide, Economics of Criminal Behavior, in 5 Encyclopedia of Law
and Economics § 8100 at 345 (Edward Elgar 2000).
36 Note, though, that implementation could be challenging. Control over time served
is highly diffuse, spread across prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges (during plea
bargains and trials), as well as parole boards (after sentencing).
37 See, for example, John H. Laub and Robert J. Sampson, Tuning Points in the Life
Course: Why Change Matters to the Study of Crime, 31 Criminol 301 (1993).
38 I spread the 25 percent cut randomly across the entire cohort. In an earlier version
of the paper I ran an alternate specification in which I cut 25 percent of the total popula-
tion, but restricted the cuts to nonviolent offenders (if nonviolent offenders made up 60
percent of the entering cohort, I reduced their numbers by 41.67 percent for a total cohort
decline of 25 percent). The results were almost identical to those of the random 25 percent
reduction, so I omit the nonviolent approach here.
39 State sentencing policies have changed over the years; the closer to the present I
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my sample in 2001 rather than 2002, so the 1999 cuts allow me
to see what happens over two years, the 1996 cuts over five.
Figure 3 graphs the 100 percent cuts and Figure 4 the 25
percent; Table 5 summarizes the findings. In each graph, the
solid line is the unshocked ersatz prison population and the
dashed line breaking away from it the shocked population. In
Figure 4, the gray dashed line in the lower part of each graph is
the "target" line, namely the unshocked population reduced by 25
percent.40 The faster the counterfactual line converges on the
target line, the less durable state prison populations are-or
phrased differently, the less important are long-serving
inmates. 41
Figure 3 makes it clear that population freezes result in rap-
id declines in prison populations. Outside of Michigan, freezes
starting in 1999 result in populations over 60 percent smaller by
2001; in six of the eleven states, over 70 percent smaller. The
1996 results are even more dramatic: within five years, four
states see reductions of over 90 percent, three over 80 percent,
and (basically) all over 75 percent. 42 Look back at Table 1.
Though the comparison is imperfect, these results suggest a
world akin to that in which x < 5, that is, in which "long-serving"
inmates often serve fewer than five years.
That said, even total prison population freezes confront a
hard, durable core of prisoners. After five years of admitting no
prisoners, states still retain between 10 percent and 25 percent
of their prisoners, and the rate of decline appears to level off in
the counterfactual scenarios, as predicted by the hypothetical
given in Table 1. Part 0 addresses this issue in depth.
Figure 4 presents the 25 percent cut, and the results here
are even sharper. In the 1999 example, populations are about 17
to 19 percent smaller within two years (except, again, for Michi-
gan, at 13 percent). In the 1996 example, declines are between 19
and 23 percent within five years-often almost the full 25 per-
cent reduction. In many cases, reducing the size of the entering
shock the data, the more likely my results are to track current outcomes. There is nothing
significant about 1999 except, given that my sample period ends in 2001, it provides me
with more than one post-shock year to observe.
40 Such a line is not necessary in Figure 3, since the target is zero--the x axis.
41 If prison populations are not durable at all-if all prisoners serve one year, so the
total population in a year is just equal to that year's admissions-then a 25 percent re-
duction in admissions leads immediately to prison population 25 percent smaller than it
otherwise would have been. The more durable the prison population-the more inmates
from previous (unshocked) years remain in prison-the smaller the immediate effect.
42 Michigan, a seemingly harsh state, reports a reduction of 74.9 percent.
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cohort by 25 percent is enough to flatten or even reverse the rate
of growth.43
Figure 3A. 100% shock in 1999
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Figure 3B. 100% shock in 1996
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Figuire 4A. 25% shock in 1999
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Table 5. Summary of counterfactual results
State 100%: 100%: 25%: 25%: 1999- 1996-
1999 1996 1999 1996 10% 10%
California 71% 90% 18% 23% 16% 21%
Colorado 76% 94% 19% 23% 17% 21%
Illinois 71% 86% 18% 22% 16% 20%
Kentucky 75% 89% 19% 22% 17% 20%
Michigan 53% 75% 13% 19% 12% 17%
Minnesota 62% 76% 15% 19% 14% 18%
Nebraska 62% 78% 15% 20% 14% 18%
New Jersey 79% 93% 20% 23% 18% 21%
S. Dakota 76% 93% 19% 24% 17% 22%
Virginia 57% 76% 14% 19% 13% 17%
Washington 67% 86% 16% 22% 15% 20%
Values in cells are the percentage difference between the real
and counterfactual ersatz populations as of the end of 2001.
Table 5 summarizes the results of Figures 3 and 4, but it al-
so includes two additional columns, " 1996-10/o" and "1999-10/o."
These columns modify the results for the 25 percent shock to ac-
count for the selection problem discussed above, namely that the
offenders not included in my ersatz prison populations are those
most likely to have very long sentences (and thus perhaps most
likely to remain in prison during the counterfactual period). To
estimate an upper bound on the importance of these offenders, I
assume that the actual prison population in 2001 is 10 percent
larger than that given in my data-that is, I assume that offend-
ers admitted before the first year of data who are still in prison
at the end of 2001 raise my ersatz prison populations by 10 per-
cent in that year.44 Table 4 indicates that this is an overly cau-
tious upper bound, and thus that this correction will overstate
the importance of self-selection (or understate the real effective-
ness of the 25 percent shock).45
44 In other words, assume that in 2001 my ersatz prison population for a particular
state is 100,000, with a 25 percent counterfactual population of 80,000 (20 percent small-
er). My selection correction adds an additional 10 percent, or 10,000, inmates to my ersatz
population, raising it to 110,000. It also adds these 10,000 inmates to the counterfactual
population, raising it to 90,000 (since these additional 10,000 were, by assumption, ad-
mitted before the reforms and remain in prison at the end of the sample period). Thus the
decline in the prison population falls from 20 percent to 18.2 percent.
45 In theory, I could augment my ersatz prison population by the difference between
the ersatz and "real" values in Table 4. That some ersatz populations are greater than
their real counterparts, however, suggests that the ersatz and NPS values are not wholly
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Accounting for the selection problem this way, however, does
not alter my basic findings about the nondurability of prison
populations. By definition the effect of the admissions-side re-
forms must be smaller, but the impact is slight: for the 1999
counterfactual the effect of reform is smaller by approximately
one to two percentage points (from a baseline of about 15 to 19
percent), and for the 1996 counterfactual by about two percent-
age points (from a baseline of about 20 to 23 percent).46 Even
the unobserved long-serving inmates do not seem to present
much of a barrier to states reducing prison populations by
reducing admissions.
Turn now to reductions in time served. As Table 6 points
out, cutting time is somewhat less effective than reducing the
entering cohort by the same percentage. This Table reports two
counterfactuals, each imposing a 25 percent reduction in the
time actually served by all inmates, one starting in 1996 and the
other in 1999, and it compares the results to the analogous cuts
in the number admitted.47 A 25 percent cut in time served in
1999, for example, produces declines that are between 12 to 49
percent smaller than a 25 percent cut in admissions; for the 1996
cut, the effects are between 3 and 34 percent smaller.48 While
less effective than reductions in the size of the entering cohort,
shortened sentences still yield reductions in prison populations
that are not trivial-7 to 16 percent for cuts in 1999 and 12 to 21
percent for cuts in 1996. These smaller effects may be justifiable
if cuts to time served are more normatively appealing than simi-
lar reductions in the number admitted; this is, however, a pro-
foundly challenging question outside the scope of this paper. 49
Moreover, in the long run a 25 percent cut in time served must
comparable.
46 For example, the 1999 counterfactual for California that does not account for the
selection effect reports a decline in expected prison population of 18 percent; the counter-
factual that does account for selection, a decline of 16 percent. Similarly, for the 1996
counterfactual, the uncorrected results report a 23 percent drop, the corrected results a
21 percent drop.
47 There is no need to consider a 100 percent reduction in time served, since that is
identical to a 100 percent reduction in the number of admissions, which is covered by
Figure 4.
48 The 10 percent check for self-selection, not reported here, returns similar results
as in Table 5: the effects are similarly one to two percentage points weaker for both the
1996 and 1999 cuts (though from slightly lower baselines).
49 There are different pragmatic issues here as well. If being incarcerated causally
increases the lifetime risk an inmate faces for future incarceration, then reducing the
number admitted may have a more powerful long-term downward push on prison popula-
tions than an otherwise-identical reduction in time served. Such dynamics, while of great
importance, are beyond the focus of this Article.
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yield the same result as a 25 percent cut in the size of the enter-
ing cohort;50 the 1996 results suggest that this convergence can
occur rapidly in some states.
Table 6. 25% shock to time served
State 1999 1996 1999-no. 1996-no.
California 15% 19% 18% 23%
Colorado 12% 17% 19% 23%
Illinois 16% 21% 18% 22%
Kentucky 14% 20% 19% 22%
Michigan 7% 12% 13% 19%
Minnesota 11% 15% 15% 19%
Nebraska 11% 16% 15% 20%
New Jersey 15% 21% 20% 23%
S. Dakota 13% 19% 19% 24%
Virginia 7% 12% 14% 19%
Washington 11% 17% 16% 22%
Values in cells are the percentage decline as of the end of 2001
for each of the counterfactual scenarios. "1999-no." and "1996-
no." restate the results for the 25 percent cut in admissions
given in Table 5.
To summarize: If politicians wish to reduce prison popula-
tions quickly in response to the present financial crisis, admis-
sion-side reforms appear to be up to the task. They may not be as
rapidly effective as release-side policies-a state could reduce its
prison population by 25 percent in a single day by releasing 25
percent of its prisoners-but they come close, and they may be
far more politically viable. Moreover, admission-side reforms can
lead to long-run reductions more efficiently than repeated
release-side actions.51 Prison populations certainly contain some
long-serving inmates, but states can accomplish a lot within the
constraints they create. That said, these long-serving inmates do
50 This follows directly from the associative property of multiplication. In the long
run, a state's prison population is simply Xy[(number serving y years)xyl. A 25 percent
cut to admissions changes this equation to Xy[(0.75xnumber serving y years)xy], and a 25
percent cut to time served to 2:y[(number serving y years)x(0.75xy)]. These are identical
quantities. The two methods have different transition paths to equilibrium, however, and
thus do not yield immediately identical results.
51 A one-time change that results in fewer annual admissions--such as establishing a
diversion program to drug courts-can lead to a long-run reduction in the prison popula-
tion, while release-side reductions have to be implemented each time the state wishes to
reduce the size of the prison population.
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impose some limits on how far admission-side reforms can go,
and the next section examines just how durable these long-
serving inmates are.
III. THE LONG-RUN RESPONSIVENESS OF PRISONS
There is an ambiguity lurking in Figure 3. On the one hand,
the rapid declines in prison populations following the admissions
freezes imply that there are not that many long-serving inmates.
On the other hand, even after a four-year freeze as many as 25
percent of all prisoners may remain behind bars, suggesting that
a relatively small number of long-serving inmates can still im-
pose a meaningful floor on the effectiveness of admission-side
reforms. 52 In this section I estimate the size of this floor and its
rate of decay over time. I also consider how significant the long-
serving inmates are to the overall cost an entering cohort impos-
es on state budgets; after all, an inmate who serves three years is
three times as expensive to house as one who serves one year, so
a small number of long-serving inmates can consume a dispro-
portionate amount of resources.
The importance of long-serving inmates has often received
significant attention. The Sentencing Project, for example, re-
cently released a report-provocatively titled No Exit-pointing
out that approximately one in eleven prisoners (over 140,000) in
the US are currently serving life sentences, with almost a quar-
ter (about 41,000) of these being sentences of life without pa-
role. 53 And life sentences reflect only a portion of the very long
sentences handed down by our criminal justice system. The elev-
en states I examine here, for example, sentenced nearly two of-
fenders to terms of over twenty years for every one given a life or
death sentence during the sample period.5 4
Yet as Figure 5 makes clear, focusing on the sentence im-
posed, rather than time served, can overestimate the number of
52 An example can make clear how this floor operates. According to my data, at the
end of 2002 California prisons contained 143,446 inmates who had been admitted since
1988 and had not yet been released. Assume that 10,000 of these inmates will not be
released until 2010. Then even a total admissions freeze starting in 2003 could not by
itself push the population below 10,000 until 2010.
53 Ashley Nellis and Ryan S. King, No Exit: The Expanding Use of Life Sentences in
America 7-9 (The Sentencing Project 2009), online at http/sentencingproject.org/doc/
publications/publicationmcnoexitseptember2009.pdf (visited Oct 3, 2010).
54 Specifically, states imposed 39,531 life or death sentences, 43,388 non-life sentenc-
es of over twenty-five years, and 25,823 sentences of twenty to twenty-five years. States
sentenced another 58,893 to terms of fifteen to twenty years, so more than three inmates
received sentences of at least fifteen years for every one receiving a life or death sentence.
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long-serving offenders. Figure 5 plots the number of inmates in
each entering cohort sentenced to some form of life sentence (life,
life plus years, life without parole, or death 55) along with the
number of such inmates from that cohort released by 2002. To be
cautious, I restrict "released" to mean some form of supervised
release, and thus I exclude releases such as transfers or even
deaths and suicides. 56 Though most inmates sentenced to life
terms serve long sentences, an appreciable number of them have
been released by 2002. In states such as Kentucky and Washing-
ton, as many as 50 percent of inmates with life sentences are re-
leased within ten or fifteen years; more common release rates are
on the order of 15 to 20 percent within that time. Even "life," in
other words, often does not mean life.
55 Classifying death as a long sentence may be somewhat controversial, but of the
states in my sample only Virginia executes a meaningful number of its death-row inmates
(105 between 1976 and 2009). California has executed thirteen, Illinois (which is now
effectively a non-death penalty state) twelve, Kentucky three, Nebraska three, South
Dakota one, and Washington four. See Death Penalty Information Center, Number of
Executions by State and Region Since 1976, online at http;//www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
number-executions-state-and-region-1976 (visited Oct 3, 2010). Thus in most states a
death penalty sentence acts as a form of life (or at least a very long) sentence.
56 The NCRP often does not define its terms clearly, so it is likely that I am excluding
both transfers within a state's system, which clearly do not reduce a state's prison popu-
lation, and transfers outside of that system-such as deportations-which do.
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The cautionary tale told in Figure 5 shapes how I address
the durability of the unreleased, long-serving inmates. While I
have data on the sentence imposed on every offender, what mat-
ters more is how long each of these offenders is expected to ac-
tually spend in prison, and the sentence imposed may not be that
reliable a signal. I thus attempt to estimate how long the in-
mates in my ersatz prisons who have not been released by the





THE DURABILITY OF PRISON POPULATIONS
these inmates there are, and I know the sentence each has re-
ceived; I then predict the rate at which these prisoners will be
released over the future years.
To make these predictions, I need to extrapolate, which is
always a risky procedure. In the Appendix, I explain in detail
how I devise my extrapolated values, but the intuition is
straightforward. Take California as an example. The data for
California start in 1988, and for that admission cohort I know
the percent of inmates released by the end of each year for the
next fourteen years (from 1988 through 2002). 57 For the 1989
admission cohort, I know a little less: the percent of inmates re-
leased each year over the next thirteen years. And so on. For the
2002 admission cohort, I know the least, namely the percent re-
leased by the end of that year. My basic strategy is to estimate,
say, the percent of the 2002 entering cohort released in 2003 (one
year after admission) using data from 1988 through 2001-all
years for which I observe the percent of inmates released one
year after admission.
Figure 6 provides a simplified concrete example, using a hy-
pothetical state whose data start in 1997. For that year, I have
complete data on the percent released for five years (1997
through 2002); for 1998 the percent for four years (1998 through
2002); and so on. These are the dark gray boxes. I then employ a
multiple imputation technique to predict the values in the un-
shaded boxes. In other words, I use the data from 1997 and 1998
to predict the percent of those admitted in 1998 who will be re-
leased five years later (in 2003). At the most extreme, I use the
data from 1997 through 2001 to predict the percent of those ad-
mitted in 2002 who will be released between 2003 and 2007.
With data starting (at the earliest) in 1997 and ending in
2002, I cannot extrapolate more than five years past the date of
admission.58 For example, for the 2002 cohort I can estimate the
release rate through 2007, and for the 2001 cohort through 2006.
I can also estimate the number of inmates remaining five years
57 A different way to conceptualize the problem would be to focus on years served, not
calendar years: to ask how many admitted in 1988 are released within one year of being
admitted (which could be in either 1988 or 1989), two years of being admitted (which
could be in either 1989 or 1990), and so on. In an earlier version of this paper I designed
the model this way, but for technical reasons years-served approach requires additional,
untestable assumptions. Since the results are nearly identical either way, I focus only on
the calendar-year approach here.
58 In my real data, I have longer time series. Illinois, for example, provides enough
data to extrapolate thirteen years into the future. I can always extrapolate at least eleven
years into the future.
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after admission, but I have no information on how these inmates
will leave over time. In other words, I can estimate (and, in the
case of 1997, know exactly) how many inmates are in the light
gray boxes-how many will not leave prison until at least the
sixth calendar year after admission-but I do not know the rate
at which they will subsequently depart. 59
Figure 6. Extrapolation example
Entry Years after admission year
year 0 2 3 4 15 6
19 1998 99 20 2001 2002 2003 2(
19 _ _1 99 20 20-(-)1 )002 2003- 2004 200
2000 2)00Q 2 2 2003 2004 2005 20
S20012003 2004 2005 2006
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2
Note: For each entry year, the dark gray boxes contain the
release years for which I have actual data, and white boxes
the years that require extrapolation. Extrapolation is not pos-
sible past the years in the light gray boxes.
To handle these long-lasting inmates, I need to make (unver-
ifiable) assumptions about the rate at which they depart. I start
by estimating an extreme upper bound. I assume that any pris-
oner not released by the end of the extrapolation period (the end
of 2002 for the 1997 entry cohort or the end of 2007 for the 2002
entry cohort) is serving a true life sentence and will not be re-
leased for another fifty years. 60 I also develop two more-moderate
rules. The first rule assumes that the inmates remaining at the
end of the extrapolation period leave uniformly over the next
twenty years; this rule is likely biased towards overestimating
the durability of long-serving inmates, given the short median
and 75th percentile times reported in Part 0 above. 61 The second
59 Thus, for 2005 I have an estimate for the percents released that year from the
2000, 2001, and 2002 entry cohorts (since 2005 is within five years of admission, and thus
within the range of extrapolation). For the 1999 entry cohort, I have an estimate of how
many prisoners are still in prison at the start of 2005, but I do not know how many of
them leave that year or any subsequent years. And for the 1997 and 1998 entry cohorts I
know even less, since my imputation does not allow me to see past 2003 (for 1997) or 2004
(for 1998).
6e For the 1997 entry cohort, these inmates leave during 2052; for the 2002 entry
cohort, during 2057.
61 Inmates admitted in 1997 and still in prison at the end of 2002 thus leave uniform-
ly between 2003 and 2023; for the 2002 cohort, between 2008 and 2028.
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rule attempts to exploit the information I have on sentences im-
posed. One inmate admitted in 2002 and still in prison in 2008
may have received a ten-year sentence and another inmate a
twenty-five year sentence; it is unlikely that each inmate is
equally likely to be released in any subsequent year. I thus cre-
ate two rates of release: one from the end of the extrapolation
period to the end of the sentencing period, and another for any
inmates who may be in prison after their official sentence has
appeared to expire.6 2 Thus, for inmates admitted in 2002 with
ten-year sentences, I impose one release rate from 2008 to 2011
(when the sentence would expire), and another from 2011 for-
ward for any inmates who appear to still remain in prison.63 Spe-
cifically, I assume that 0.5 percent of the entering cohort departs
each year up until the sentence maximum, and then the remain-
der decay uniformly over the next five years, though all are re-
leased within fifty years.6 4
I do not assume that any of my rules accurately captures the
real release rates that we should expect to see in the data. My
goal here is to estimate the robustness of extrapolations of this
sort and to measure the range of possible outcomes we can rea-
sonably expect to witness in the future. Any extrapolation must
be viewed cautiously, and my findings here are broad estimates
at best.
Figure 7 plots the basic results. By design, most of my mod-
els produce a cadre of inmates who spend many years in prison-
under the twenty-year decay rule no state runs out of prisoners65
until 2032 at the earliest, and under the more complex 0.5 per-
cent rule not until 2051. But there are only a few of these highly
62 Several of my sentence categories are ranges, such as "eleven to fifteen years." For
my purposes here, I focus solely on the maximum of the range, which overestimates the
durability of inmates. Efforts to develop a more sophisticated measure were thwarted by
errors in the NCRP.
63 Why might inmates with ten-year sentences serve more than ten years? Malfea-
sance in prison is one possible explanation. So too is an inmate receiving additional time
for a separate offense, the sentencing for which was not completed until after he had
already started serving time in prison (due, say, to an ongoing appeal). Unfortunately,
data error (such as incorrect information on the sentence imposed, for example) may play
a role as well.
64 For example, assume that my hypothetical state admits 1,000 prisoners for assault
with ten-year sentences in 2002, and that according to my extrapolated data 450 remain
at the start of 2008 (the end of my extrapolated data). My rule states that 0.5 percent of
the original 1,000-or five inmates-leave each year between 2008 and 2011 (for a total of
twenty inmates), when the term expires. The remaining 430 leave uniformly over the
years 2012 through 2017.
65 Recall that what is being measured here is not when the total prison population
would hit zero but when the pool of inmates admitted during my sample period (the late
1980s/early 1990s through 2002) would finally depreciate to zero.
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durable inmates, and overall durability is much less. Consider
the number of inmates remaining fifteen years after my sample
ends, in 2018. Under the upper-bound model there are 56,015
inmates left across all eleven states; under the twenty-year decay
model, 33,935; and under the 0.5 percent model, 25,507. My er-
satz prison populations totaled approximately 305,000 in 2003,
so in percentage terms between 8 and 18 percent of those still in
prison at the end of 2002 would remain as of 2018.
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What are the national implications? Assuming that the ex-
periences in these states (which hold just over 30 percent of US
prisoners) are nationally representative, my results suggest that
of all the prisoners admitted from the late 1980s/1990s to the
early 2000s, between 84,000 and 184,000 would remain in prison
nationwide by 2018. The upper bound-built on unrealistic as-
sumptions-is nothing to scoff at, representing about half the
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
size of the entire US prison population in the 1970s. But the less
extreme values suggest that, left untouched (that is, subjected to
no early-release policies), the pool of inmates admitted during
the 1990s and early 2000s will decay rather rapidly on its own.
I want to conclude this section by addressing one last long-
run question: what fraction of the total costs imposed by an en-
tering cohort is produced by the longest-serving inmates? There
are important political-economy implications to its answer. The
larger the share of costs borne by the future, the tougher it may
be to enact meaningful reform.
A simple example makes the problem clear. If housing a
prisoner for one year costs the state $10,000, then there are at
least two ways an entering cohort can cost a state $250,000 (ig-
noring present-value discounting for simplicity): by admitting
twenty-five prisoners for one year each or by admitting one pris-
oner for a twenty-five year term. The first option is more costly to
political incumbents-the governor, the legislators, the mayors-
because they bear the full financial cost of the twenty-five incar-
cerations, and thus the full opportunity and political costs as
well. Not so in the second case, in which much of the spending is
deferred. Today's politicians reap the short-run benefits being
"tough on crime," but they push much of the costs (both financial
and political) onto future administrations.
I thus measure how much of an entering cohort's "lifetime"
costs are incurred in the short-run as compared to the long run.
For two of my release rules (the twenty-year decay rule and up-
per bound66) I estimate the total number of bed-years that each
entering cohort is expected to consume and thus the total cost
that this consumption will impose on state budgets. 67 I then de-
rive how much of that total is accumulated during that cohort's
first year and first five years (the short run) as well as after ten
years and after twenty (the long run).68 Figure 8 presents the
66 The results for the twenty-year and the 0.5 percent rules are almost identical, so I
omit the latter to conserve space.
67 Assuming that the annual real cost of incarcerating an inmate is flat, then looking
at bed-years is identical to looking at real costs. As noted in Part 0, real per-prisoner costs
appear to have declined slightly, which implies that my bed-year analysis will overstate
the importance of long-serving inmates to the total real cost imposed by an entering co-
hort.
68 An example can make this clear. Consider a state that admits ten prisoners in
1990. Three (A, B, and C) spend one year in prison, two (D and E) spend two years, three
(F, G, and H) spend seven years, and two (I and J) spend fifteen years. The total number
of bed-years this cohort consumes is fifty-eight: (3xl) + (2x2) + (3x7) + (2x15) = 58. During
the first year, ten bed-years are consumed-not just those for A, B, and C, but one year
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results for the less-extreme twenty-year rule, which suggest that
much of the cost of an entering cohort is incurred in the early
years of its admission. More than half the lifetime cost is consist-
ently borne during the first five years, with highs often reaching
75 percent and above. In some cases, half the total costs are in-
curred during the very first year, implying that a majority of the
financial punch is felt by the incumbent administrations. Even in
the upper-bound results, which by construction substantially
overestimate the impact of long-serving inmates, about 40 to 50
percent of lifetime costs are incurred during the first five years in
most of the eleven states. That said, the costs pushed onto future
policymakers are not trivial. For the twenty-year extrapolation
rule, nearly 20 percent (and in some cases as much as 30 per-
cent) of a cohort's total cost is incurred at least ten years after
admission in most of the states, and over 5 percent (and in some
cases over 10 percent) at least twenty years after admission.
These percentages rise to over 40 percent and over 33 percent,
respectively, for the upper-bound rule.
Thus some cost shifting to future administrations is clearly
taking place. But the policymakers responsible for the sentences
imposed on a given cohort nonetheless bear a substantial portion
of the lifetime demands they are imposing on state budgets, sug-
gesting that the partially deferred costs of long-serving inmates
need not seriously impede reform (though plenty of other politi-
cal pressures may).
each for D through J as well, since an inmate imposes the same costs on the state budget
during the first year after admission whether he is serving one year or twenty. During
the first five years, the cohort consumes a total of thirty-two bed-years: A, B and C con-
tribute one each, D and E two each, and F through J five each. Looking at the long run,
sentences of more than ten years contribute a total of ten bed-years to the total: I and J
each consume five bed-years after ten years. So of the total cost, 10/58 (or 17 percent)
occurs during the first year, 32/58 (or 55 percent) occurs during the first five years (to
partition fully, years two through five contribute 22/58, or 38 percent, of the cost), and
only 10/58 (or 17 percent again) is pushed more than ten years into the future.
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CONCLUSION
As the current financial crisis continues to force states to
wrestle with deteriorating fiscal conditions, prison expenditures
increasingly look like a promising place to cut spending. With
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crime rates still at historic lows, the political salience of crime
has surely weakened, providing politicians with a window of op-
portunity. These historic lows further suggest that reducing pris-
on populations may also be good criminological policy, since the
marginal admittee to prison may no longer be cost justifiable.
In this paper, I have sought to measure the feasibility of re-
form. In particular, I have asked whether today's policymakers
can quickly restrict or even reverse prison growth by relying sole-
ly on forward-looking, admission-side reforms-admitting fewer
prisoners or imposing shorter sentences on those admitted-
without turning to policies such as early releases for those al-
ready incarcerated. The effectiveness of such approaches turn
critically on how quickly those already in prison will leave in fu-
ture years. My results indicate that admission-side reforms may
in fact be quite effective. Prison populations do not appear to be
particularly durable, so yesterday's decisions do not shape to-
morrow's prison populations as strongly as may have been
thought. That is not to deny the existence of a durable core of
long-serving inmates-such prisoners clearly appear in my da-
ta-but rather to suggest that states can accomplish much de-
spite the constraints these prisoners impose.
APPENDIX
In this Appendix I discuss in more detail the nature of the
NCRP data and how I handled its limitations, and I explain more
fully how I generated the counterfactuals used in Part II and the
imputed data used in Part III.
A. The Structure of the NCRP
The Bureau of Justice Statistics began compiling the NCRP
in 1983, and it continues to gather data to this day; this paper
uses data through 2002, the most recent year available when it
was begun. Participation has always been voluntary, and while
only thirteen states provided data in 1983, approximately forty
do so now. Officials in participating states fill out a card for each
inmate when he enters prison, and they complete a separate card
upon his release. The NCRP thus provides offender-level data on
the exact dates an inmate enters and leaves prison, as well as
demographic and offense information. For this paper, I focus
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solely on the primary conviction offense and the total maximum
sentence imposed. 69
Though it is the most detailed centralized source of infor-
mation on prison inmates available, the NCRP suffers from some
substantial flaws. First, there are significant discrepancies be-
tween the NCRP and other sources of data. In many instances,
the total number of admissions or release entries in the NCRP
for a particular state varies greatly from the same number re-
ported in the BJS's National Prisoner Survey dataset-at times
by as much as 75 or 100 percent. The eleven states listed in Ta-
ble 2 are the only ones that provide a sufficiently long string of
consecutive years (at least eleven) that do not deviate too much
(generally by less than 10 percent) from the corresponding NPS
data.
Second, and more problematic, the NCRP's admissions and
release files are wholly separate, with no variable that links an
observation in the admissions file to that inmate's subsequent
release entry. This does not restrict my ability to calculate time
served by those released, since the release file contains both ad-
mission and release dates for each inmate. But it does signifi-
cantly complicate my ability to determine how many prisoners
from a particular admission cohort remain unreleased at the end
of 2002.
If the NCRP contained no reporting flaws, calculating these
remaining inmates would be trivial. The admissions data would
tell me, for example, how many thirty-five-year-old black males
convicted of arson and sentenced to eight years entered prison in
California in 1995 (say, one hundred). And the release files for
1995 through 2002 would tell me how many thirty-five-year-old
black males convicted of arson and sentenced to eight years who
entered prison in California in 1995 were released in each subse-
quent year (say, ten each year). The number of these inmates
still in prison at the end of 2002 would simply be twenty: the one
hundred admissions minus the eighty releases (ten released per
year for eight years). The NCRP contains so much demographic
data that I would be able to precisely identify which inmates in
each admission file never show up in the subsequent release files
and who are thus still in prison at the end of 2002.70 In short, I
69 The focus on the maximum, as opposed to the minimum, is in part simply a conces-
sion to data. The NCRP includes a variable for minimum sentence imposed, but it is
blank for a large percentage of entries; total maximum sentence is reported for almost
every offender.
70 Even a state with a prison system as large as California's likely does not admit too
[2010:110
THE DURABILITY OF PRISON POPULATIONS
could merge the admission and release files to create an inte-
grated dataset.
Unfortunately, flaws in the NCRP make this impossible. The
key problem is that in many cases it appears that over 100 per-
cent of a certain type of inmate in a specific entering cohort are
released by 2002: a state may admit one hundred inmates of a
particular type in 1990 but appear to release 120 such prisoners
over the next thirteen years. In numerous cases, prisoners who
do not exist in the admissions files appear in the release files-
for example, no prisoner is admitted in California in 1988 for
crime code 13, yet several prisoners released in subsequent years
from the 1988 entry cohort are listed as having committed code-
13 crimes. The reasons for these differences cannot be deter-
mined.71
There is no (apparent) overrelease problem when looking at
unconditional total counts. 72 But the magnitude of the errors
tends to grow with the level of detail in the data. Conditioning on
just the primary conviction offense and the total maximum sen-
tence imposed, as I do here, yields overcounts for some states
that run as high as 620 inmates.73 And these are the errors that
remain after I take other steps to minimize the overcount prob-
lem: I do not condition on the NCRPs 186 offense codes and con-
tinuous measure of sentence imposed, but rather use less granu-
many prisoners with the identical dates of admission, races, sexes, ethnicities, birthdays,
educations, crimes of conviction, sentences imposed, credits granted for time already
served, and so on.
71 Since the offense variable measures the offense of conviction, such discrepancies
cannot be the result of subsequent crimes committed while in prison (for which there is
separate entry).
72 The total number admitted to a particular cohort is always greater than the total
number of that cohort released over all subsequent years. For example, the 1990 admis-
sion file reports that Illinois admitted 17,971 prisoners that year, and the release files for
1990 through 2002 provide information on 17,822 releases from that cohort. I say "appar-
ent," though, because that fact does not guarantee that the number of releases is not an
overcount, just that whatever overcount takes place is sufficiently small that it does not
lead to an impossible outcome.
73 In other words, the 1988 admission file claims that Michigan admitted 134 prison-
ers with an offense code of 35 and a sentence range code of 12, yet the release files from
1988 to 2002 contain a total of 754 releasees who are allegedly offense-35/ sentence-12
offenders admitted in 1988, an overcount of 620.
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lar measures that reduce the number of offense codes to sixteen
74
and the measure of sentence imposed to fifteen clusters. 75
These errors in the data preclude me from directly merging
the admission and release files. To get around this, I create
"phantom" observations for the unreleased members of a cohort
(initially assuming there is no overcount problem) and attach
them to the release file. A simple example makes this process
clear. Assume that Colorado admits one hundred offense-
4/sentence-8 inmates in 1994, and that it releases seventy-five of
these inmates between 1994 and 2002. The release files provide
the complete data on the seventy-five released inmates, and I
then create twenty-five "phantom" inmates for those not yet re-
leased (who I know are offense-4/sentence-8 and admitted in
1994, though I do not know more than that). I thus have in effect
an integrated dataset. The one missing piece of data for the
phantom inmates that can be important is the day and month of
admission; I randomly assign these dates to the phantom in-
mates.76
All that is left is to correct for the overcount problem. The
overcounts do not reflect departures that did not happen, nor the
failure to account for admissions that did happen-they are cod-
ing errors, inmates who are classified one way at entry and an-
other way at exit. 77 It is impossible, however, to correct these
errors directly. Instead I develop a more indirect solution.
74 The sixteen are: murder and other killing offenses (including assault with intent to
kill), kidnapping, sex offenses, robbery, assault (including hit-and-runs and child abuse),
burglary, arson, theft and associated offenses (including trafficking, distributing, or re-
ceiving stolen goods), drug trafficking, drug possession, persistent felony violators, un-
known offenses, and four "other" categories (other violent, other property, other drugs,
and other [lesser] crimes that do not fit easily into the violent/property/drug taxonomy).
75 The fifteen are less than a year; one year ranges from one to two years through
nine to ten years; ten years (and a day) to fifteen years, fifteen years (and a day) to twen-
ty years; twenty years (and a day) to twenty-five years; over twenty-five years but not life;
and all life and death sentences. In general, at least 80 percent of all sentences for all
categories of crimes are below ten years, and 90 percent are below twenty years.
76 In the data, the day and month of admission are uniformly distributed across the
month and year of admission, respectively, so I draw my fake days and months from a
uniform distribution.
77 For example, according to the wholly aggregated data, California admitted 97,259
inmates in 1990, and between 1990 and 2002 released 96,974 of this cohort, leaving 285
in prison as of the end of 2002. Disaggregating by offense and sentence range codes yields
195 offense/sentence pairs, and the number of inmates remaining in prison at the end of
2002 across these 195 pairs ranges from 774 to -126 (that is, the data indicate that the
number of releases for a particular offense/sentence pair exceed the number of admissions
by 126). The average number remaining per pair, though, is 1.461538, and 195x1.461538
= 285, the same number remaining from the disaggregated data.
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A simple example illuminates the problem and demonstrates
how I correct it. Assume that in 1990, a particular state admits
900 inmates, and between 1990 and 2002 it releases 850 of them,
so 50 remain in prison at the end of 2002. My methodology above
would start with the 850 observations from the release files and
then create 50 phantom offenders to create a full set of prisoners.
Now assume I condition on some trait, resulting in two groups of
inmates, A and B. According to the admissions file, the state ad-
mits 500 of type A and 400 of type B in 1990. According to the
release files, however, between 1990 and 2002 the state releases
520 of type A and 330 of type B; assume the unseen true values
are 490 and 360, respectively. 78 The total remaining in prison is
the same: the state has released 850 (520 + 330) of the 900 (500 +
400). But things get tricky when I try to create my phantom ob-
servations. My data claim that I should create -20 phantoms of
type A and 70 phantoms of type B. In theory, I would like to cor-
rect this by turning 30 erroneous phantom Bs into phantom As,
but I do not actually know that the number misclassified is 30. I
know that it is at least 20, but I have no more information than
that. I cannot create "negative" phantoms, and simply ignoring
type As (creating zero phantoms of this type) while creating 70
phantom type Bs leads me to overstate the size of the prison
population.
My solution, then, is the following. I constrain the number of
"overage" inmates released to the number admitted: the number
of type As released is restricted to five hundred. I then reduce
the number of type B phantoms from seventy to fifty-by the
number of overcounts of type As in the data. So I end up with
zero type-A phantoms and fifty type-B phantoms. Of course, this
is likely not the true correct value (in my example, I produce ten
too few type As), but it is the best I can do with the data availa-
ble, and it is likely a close enough approximation.
In practice, I have more than two categories-for California,
for example, I have 195 categories in 1990. I thus take a more
aggregate approach. I total the number of overages within a
state/year and then randomly delete that many phantoms from
the non-overage offense/sentence pairs. For example, in Califor-
nia in 1990, 100 of the 195 offense/sentence pairs yield overages,
ranging from -1 to -126, for a total of 1,702 excess releases. The
remaining 95 pairs have remainders ranging from 0 to 774, for a
78 I am assuming here that the errors are on the release end, not in admissions. I
have no evidence either way, and there does not appear to be any ex ante bias to choosing
one assumption about the location of the errors over any other.
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total of 1,987 phantoms. I thus randomly delete 1,702 of these
1,987 phantoms, leaving me with 285 phantom observations, ex-
actly as required.7 9 With this adjustment, I have a complete set
of observations. I have real data on all those released, and I have
phantom observations on all those admitted but not yet released.
I then use these data to produce my ersatz prison populations.
B. More on the Short-Run Extrapolations
Part II above explains the number-of-admissions counterfac-
tuals in detail. One feature of the time-served counterfactual,
however, requires further explanation. Unlike the counterfactu-
als that shocked the number of admissions, those that shocked
the time served require looking into the future. Consider the
counterfactual that reduced the time served by 25 percent start-
ing in 1996. An inmate admitted in 1996 and-prior to the
shock-destined to serve 7 years would not leave until 2003,
which is outside the range of the data. With the 25 percent re-
duction, however, he would leave prison in 2001, after only 5.25
years in prison. I thus need to estimate how many such out-of-
range offenders exist and "pull" them out of the future. To do
this, I use the extrapolated data that I develop in Part III (and
which I discuss in more detail in the next part of this section).
Using such extrapolations, of course, introduces extra uncer-
tainty into the results, since the reliability of the counterfactual
values turns on the reliability of the extrapolation. It is for this
reason that I examine the period from 1999 to 2001, rather than
from 2000 to 2002-no extrapolated values are needed to run the
1999 shock counterfactual through 2001. The only offenders who
need to be "pulled" from outside the range of 1999 to 2001 are
some of those released in 2002, and I have real data on the num-
ber of such releasees and the time they actually served.
C. Extrapolating the Long-Run Models
To calculate how long offenders admitted during my sample
period may endure into the future requires extrapolation. To do
this, I use the multiple-interpolation package that is part of the
Stata 11 release. Figure 6 above explains the basic intuition;
here I just touch on some of the more technical aspects of my ap-
proach. My data allow me to calculate the percentage of each en-
79 Recall from note 77 above that by 2002 California had released 96,974 of the
97,259 inmates it admitted in 1990, implying that 285 from that entering cohort re-
mained in prison at the end of 2002.
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tering cohort that is released in the year of admission, the next
year, and so on, for some number of years: for the 1988 cohort,
for example, I can compute fifteen years of release rates, for the
1989 cohort fourteen years, etc., leading to a triangular grid of
values akin to that given in Figure 6. Before running the imputa-
tion program, I convert the per-period release rates into cumula-
tive release rates. I then run fifty multiple-imputation iterations
to fill in the bottom half of the triangle and average across all
fifty to generate my estimated release rates.
These estimates require some cleaning. In some cases, the
estimated values "backtrack": for a particular cohort the cumula-
tive percent released twelve years out, for example, may be esti-
mated as being less than that eleven years out, an impossibility.
In these cases I set the backtracking value equal to its predeces-
sor, effectively assuming in such cases that no one was released
in that year.80 I also cap the cumulative probabilities at one.
With these corrections, I am able to estimate the results shown
in Figure 6.
80 Note that my data are disaggregated by offense and sentence range, so I am not
assuming that a state released no prisoners for a year, but rather that no prisoners from
the backsliding offense/sentence pair were released.
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